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Social Identification Beyond the Speech Event

Stanton Wortham
University of Pennsylvania

In order to identify an individual, participants and analysts must interpret signs uttered
or displayed by that individual, or signs uttered or displayed by others with respect to that
individual. At the moment of utterance or display, however, participants and analysts
often do not know what context is relevant for interpreting a sign of identity. We can
interpret signs of identity only as they get recontextualized by subsequent discourse
(Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Goffman, 1976; Silverstein, 1992). Although there are of
course many formulaic, predictable interactions, participants and analysts can generally
identify an individual only over time, as a pattern of mutually-presupposing indexical
signs comes to establish that the sign of identity in question did in fact have a determinate
meaning (Silverstein, 1998; Wortham, 2001a).
In a classroom, for example, when an adolescent says something like “if I go shoot
you in the head” to a teacher during discussion of an academic point, we might think that
we can identify the student as threatening or at least as disruptive. With more information
about the context, however, our interpretation of the sign might change. If the utterance is
embedded in a hypothetical discussion, in which the teacher and other students have also
imagined immoral acts of this sort in order to clarify an academic argument, the student
may be a productive contributor. Other utterances from the conversation, in addition to
nonverbal signs, will be essential to interpreting any such sign of identity. In most cases, a
set of signs will come consistently to presuppose one meaning or another for the sign—
because several signs will all indicate a similar sort of identity for the participant in
question. At that point, a plausible interpretation for the signs of identity will gel.
But plausible interpretation of a sign of identity does not depend only on other signs
from within the speech event. It also matters, for instance, how that student has been
identified in the classroom up to this point in his or her academic career. Has the student
been identified as hostile and disruptive, or as congenial and promising? Answering this
question requires data from earlier in the academic year, and perhaps data about decadesold institutionalized mechanisms for sorting and identifying students. We might imagine a
radial geometry of potentially relevant context, centered on the speech event and the focal
sign of identity. Identifying the speaker identified by that sign will require indexical links
to various aspects of the context, aspects located at different points in the radial geometry.
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This speech event-centered view of social identification has limitations, however,
because the social identification of an individual is rarely accomplished, outside of ritual
events, in one discursive interaction. Individuals get socially identified across a chain
(Agha, 2003; in press) or trajectory (Dreier, 2003) of events, as subsequent events come
increasingly to presuppose identities signaled in earlier ones. This view focuses not on
one utterance or one event, together with context relevant to that focal point, but on the
trajectory across which an individual moves. The interpretation of each point in the
trajectory only occurs with respect to a set of mutually-presupposing indexical signs that
co-occur within a speech event. But the chain of events across which an individual gets
identified is more than just several pieces of the relevant context as seen from the
perspective of one utterance or speech event. The chain or trajectory must itself be the
focal point of analysis, at least when analyzing the process of social identification, because
identification generally occurs across events.
Just as signs of identity cannot normally be interpreted at the moment of utterance,
without subsequent relevant context, events of identification often cannot be interpreted
without reference to prior and subsequent events along a trajectory. In order for
participants and analysts to interpret whether an event of identification in fact
characterizes an individual more generally, they must attend to subsequent events in which
that individual gets identified. Only as interpretable signs of identity from several events
come to presuppose each other does a robust identity for an individual emerge. This
chapter describes how social identification can become increasingly robust, across
discursive interactions, by tracing the identification of an American high school student in
one classroom across an academic year. The chapter describes unexpected twists in the
identity development of this student, twists that emerged across several months in a ninth
grade classroom. It shows how she develops from being a typical student to being an
outcast in the classroom, as the teachers and other students come consistently to position
her this way.
1. Beyond Macro and Micro in Social Identification
Once we leave the boundaries of the speech event as the focus of analysis, we seem to
have opened Pandora’s Box. Many have warned against units of analysis that go beyond
what we can observe empirically in a speech event and its immediate context (Garfinkel,
1967; Rampton, 1999; Schegloff, 1998). Macrosociological accounts that use analysts’
categories to obliterate participants’ realities are a real danger. In order to see how
analysts can go beyond the speech event in an empirically warranted and theoretically
coherent way, we must briefly examine contemporary “macro,” “micro” and “practice”
accounts of social identification.
Individuals behave in certain ways or manifest certain characteristics, and those
behaviors or characteristics are interpreted by the individual and by others as signs of
identity, as indicating that the individual belongs to some recognized social type. Even
though countless events of social identification happen unproblematically in everyday life,
however, it is not easy to explain how this process occurs. Any sign of identity can be
interpreted in more than one way, and the behavior of any individual contains many
potential signs of identity which might support conflicting identifications of that individual.
This creates indeterminacy in social identification: participants and observers might attend
to different signs, or interpret the same signs differently, such that the focal individual
would be identified differently. Given this indeterminacy, how do individuals get
routinely identified in practice?
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This indeterminate relation between signs and categories of identity is never
overcome in principle—despite various proposals about how a “grammar” of mental
intentions or rigid rules of language use determine what a sign of identity means (e.g.,
Searle, 1969). In practice, as more signs of identity emerge and index relevant context, the
signs do tend to presuppose converging things about individuals’ identities. A sign of
identity generally comes to have a clear meaning over time, as subsequent signs
recontextualize it in a configuration of signs, relevant context and presupposed categories
of identity that solidifies over an interaction (Silverstein, 1992; Wortham, 2001a).
This process of social identification happens only in actual events, and signs of
identity can be interpreted only with respect to particular contexts of use. But a sign
cannot contribute to social identification if it does not index a more widely circulating
model that includes categories for types of people and types of events. Holland and her
colleagues (Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner & Cain, 1998) refer to these models as “figured
worlds,” culturally shared, often idealized types of events that involve recognizable sorts
of people engaged in characteristic sorts of actions.
The most common account of social identification proposes a “dialectic” between
macro-level models and categories of identity and micro-level events of identification.
“Dialectic” here is not used in the more complex Hegelian sense, but simply to mean the
mutual constitution or moving back and forth between two poles. On such an account,
more widely circulating categories of identity constrain acts of identification, but
particular acts either reinforce or help to transform the macro-level categories. This
position is often credited to Giddens (1976), who called it “structuration,” but many others
have adopted a similar position (cf., e.g., Linger, 2001).
This “macro-micro dialectic” account of social identification captures some essential
aspects of the process. Identification cannot occur unless people presuppose more widely
circulating categories and models of identity, but these models only exist in particular
events, in which they are always recontextualized and often inflected in specific ways.
Despite its apparent plausibility, however, many have recently criticized the macro-micro
dialectic model (e.g., Bourdieu, 1972/1977; Holland & Lave, 2001; Urban, 2001). At its
worst, the model presupposes macro-level properties of groups or institutions, without
explaining how these are created and maintained—except with the vague claim that they
are “constituted” in actual events, a claim which means simply that macro-level categories
repeatedly appear in actual events. But a deterministic macro-level account would agree
with this claim too. Theories of the macro-micro dialectic risk masking macro-level
determinism with vague assertions about practice and agency.
Many have recently sought to avoid these shortcomings, while preserving the
strengths of macro-micro accounts, by studying “practice.” Dorothy Holland and Jean
Lave (Holland & Lave, 2001; Lave & Wenger, 1991) have begun to do this with their
concepts of “community of practice” and “history in person.” Instead of describing
individuals and events as already formed and “affected by” or “creating” social categories
and institutions, they study the constitution of selves, events and institutions in practice.
Practices are sociohistorically produced, but they are not just derived from macro-level
categories. Holland and Lave redescribe macro-level categories and institutions in terms
of “enduring struggles,” to emphasize how they are contested and constituted in practice.
Particular events and actions can intervene in and transform these struggles, but such acts
and events are always mediated by sociocultural forms that pre-exist particular events.
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Practice theory promises a more specific account of how micro and macro interrelate.
By examining the third realm of practice, analysts can explore how categories of identity
and events of identification are jointly produced in context. This approach only works if
“practice” gets specified, however. One sometimes hears the word invoked, as if its
proponents have identified the fundamental level at which social life operates—even
though the word gets used to describe widely differing levels, from types of human
activities that recur over decades (e.g., Taylor, 1985), to particular sets of events involving
similar people that take place over months (e.g., Gregory, 2001), to particular events that
take place over a few minutes (e.g., Rampton, 1999). If “practice” is to be where various
components come together to produce social identities, so that we can analyze how the
process actually works, we must know more specifically what it looks like.
Cole (1996) and Lemke (2000) provide a useful concept here: “timescales.” A
timescale is the spatiotemporal envelope within which a process happens. The emergence
of capitalism, a process which in some respects has taken millennia, and in other respects
centuries (cf. Postone, 1993), occurs at a very long timescale. In contrast, individuals
develop their capacities and live their lives at an ontogenetic timescale, across decades.
Particular groups develop relationships and local habits, like those that emerge within a
classroom, at a “meso-level” timescale that covers the weeks, months or years that a group
interacts together. And particular events take place at shorter timescales, taking minutes
or hours. “Macro,” “micro” and “practice,” then, abstract away from a diverse continuum
of timescales.
“Practice” cannot be one particular, privileged timescale. “In practice” does not mean
only events that happen across months but not decades, for example, or across months but
not days. One could posit an indefinite number of intervening timescales, from the life of
the universe to nanoseconds, and it would be empirically false to claim that some
timescale, or some particular combination, was naturally basic to human activity (Lemke,
2000). If “practice” is to help us specify how various relevant components (“macro,”
“micro,” “meso” and other) constitute a process like social identification, it must be
understood more generically, as something like: the set of processes, drawing on
components from various timescales that are relevant to constituting a focal phenomenon.
The timescales relevant to explaining a social phenomenon cannot be determined in
advance, but depend on the particular phenomenon being explained. In order to explain
the development and spread of Received Pronunciation in Britain, for instance, Agha
(2003) shows that the relevant processes took place over a couple of centuries, with crucial
developments (e.g., involving the increased circulation of popular novels containing
extensive quoted speech) at the timescale of years and decades. Although some processes
at both longer and shorter timescales played some role, Agha shows that the key processes
in this case involve centuries, decades, and particular events of writing, reading and
interactionally circulating the relevant metapragmatic models. In this chapter I argue that,
in order to explain the emergence of identities in a classroom, we must attend to a
somewhat different set of timescales. We must attend particularly to the locally emerging
models and categories of identity in the classroom over the year, as these interrelate with
more widely circulating conceptions of gender, race and schooling. And we must attend
to how these widely and locally circulating models occur in two particular kinds of
events—explicit metapragmatic labeling of students and “participant examples” (Wortham,
1994) that include these students as characters in the example. These two cases, of
Received Pronunciation and classroom identity development, illustrate how the relevant
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timescales for explaining any social phenomenon depend on the particulars of the case.
We cannot develop a general social theory that specifies the primordial timescales from
which all phenomena can be explained, because different phenomena will best be
explained using different configurations of timescales.
The analyses below illustrate how one student gets identified contrary to some
important macro and meso-level models of gender in a classroom, and how she struggles
with and against her emerging identity. The analyses show how meso-level processes, like
the development of categories within a particular classroom over several months, play an
essential role in constituting the social identification of a student. I do not claim that the
particular timescales that I cite in this case are always the right ones for studying social
identification. The relevant processes and timescales will vary depending on the focal
phenomenon being analyzed. Nor do I claim to have analyzed all timescales relevant to
the social identification of this student in this classroom—to do so would require much
more space. But I do claim to show that adequate analysis of social identification in this
case must attend to how processes at various timescales interconnect. I emphasize the
meso-level processes of teachers’ and students’ months-long development of categories
and identities, in order to highlight how micro and macro by themselves will not suffice as
analytic tools.
2. Methods and Ethnographic Background
Colleoni High is a large three-story brick building that occupies an entire city block.
When it was built about 50 years ago, Colleoni enrolled primarily Catholic children from
Irish and Italian backgrounds. The neighborhood has become predominantly African
American, together with growing populations of Latino and South Asian immigrants. In
the early 1990s, when I was there, the student body was ethnically mixed and mostly
working and lower class. 50% of the students were black, 25% were Latino, 15% were
white, and 10% were Asian. The faculty contained many whites, some blacks, and a few
Latinos.
I spent 128 hours at Colleoni over two years, more than 100 of them in classes.
Three-quarters of those classroom hours came in the final year, when I audiotaped most
classes that I observed. Throughout my time at Colleoni I took fieldnotes, I had many
informal conversations with teachers after classes, and I conducted interviews with
teachers, administrators, and students. I spent about 50 hours in one particular class across
the final year. Fifteen of the 19 students in this ninth grade class were black, and 14 were
female.
Like many other schools in the city, Colleoni participated voluntarily in desegregation
by offering a special educational program to students throughout the district. At Colleoni,
the program was based on guidelines from The Paideia Proposal (Adler, 1982). Parents
and educators considered this program to be academically superior to most neighborhood
schools, but not on par with the prestigious magnet programs. About one quarter of the
students at Colleoni participated in this special program. Most of these students did not
live in the neighborhood, and some commuted substantial distances. Following Adler’s
advice, the teachers at Colleoni tried to engage student with “genuine questions.” They
encouraged “seminar” discussions in which students presented and defended positions on
complex questions, instead of simply parroting back the teacher’s preferred answers. The
two ninth grade teachers that I observed in the final year, Mrs. Bailey and Mr. Smith, ran
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joint history/English classes twice a week, when they had 80-minute seminar discussions
with the nineteen students. The other three days a week each teacher ran more
conventional didactic lessons for 40 minutes each. Increasingly over the year, they
engaged students in rich discussions of complex texts—discussions in which students
came to recognize issues of enduring human concern and to formulate their own
arguments about these issues.
I made contact with Colleoni through the administrator who ran the special program.
I told him I was interested in observing the program itself, as well as classroom language
use. He selected certain teachers for me to talk to. I spoke with these teachers, received
permission from them, and then began visiting their classrooms. I introduced myself to
teachers as someone who had read a lot about classrooms in books, but who did not know
much about them in practice. I tried to minimize any authority I brought with me from the
university, by presenting myself as a novice who wanted to learn how teaching and
learning actually happen. Nonetheless, teachers were initially uncomfortable with me in
their classrooms. I received many sidelong glances, as well as indirect requests for
information on what I was doing and what I thought of them. Like the teachers, at first the
students wondered who I was and what I was doing. After a few weeks, however, teachers
and students came to ignore me during class. They clearly knew I was there, especially
when I began recording classes. After a particularly bad joke someone would occasionally
comment “and that was recorded for posterity.” But after the first few weeks of recording,
I noticed few differences between the classes I had observed without recording equipment
and those I taped.
The analyses for this chapter involved two types of speech events: explicit
metapragmatic descriptions of the focal student and “participant examples,” in which this
student herself becomes a character in examples used to discuss the subject matter
(Wortham, 1994). In analyzing the tapes and fieldnotes from Mr. Smith and Mrs. Bailey's
class, I focused on such examples. I transcribed all examples that included the focal
student and analyzed them for any implications they might have for students' social
identities. The methods of discourse analysis, which identify types of cues that often serve
as signs of identity, are described in Wortham (2001a). In addition, I have gone through
all tapes and notes, looking for explicit statements about, and implicit positioning relevant
to, the focal student’s identity. The data analyses in the next section present representative
instances from across the year in which the focal student (“Tyisha”) gets socially
identified, plus one extended participant example that contributed to her emerging social
identity in the classroom.
3. Tyisha the Disruptive Student
Almost from the beginning of the year in Mrs. Bailey and Mr. Smith’s class, teachers
and most students presupposed that girls and boys have different social identities with
respect to school. As Mrs. Bailey said explicitly one day in November, girls are easier for
teachers to deal with, because they conform to school expectations, and thus they are more
likely to succeed in school and in adulthood. Boys are more difficult to deal with, because
they resist school expectations, and they are less likely to succeed both in school and in
later life. This expectation about identity draws on circulating sociohistorical patterns,
like those that identify adolescent boys as disdainful of school success (Newkirk, 2002)
and those that identify black male students as particularly concerned with respect and
more likely to resist participation in school (Anderson 1999; Ferguson 2000). But the
gender difference was especially salient in this classroom, for two reasons. First, Mrs.
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Bailey believed what she said—she both explicitly and implicitly stated it throughout the
year, and the girls took many opportunities to remind the boys about these presupposed
gender differences. Second, from early in the year the boys all tried to sit together in the
back of the room, and all but one of them generally refused to participate, while many
girls participated actively and dominated classroom discussions.
3.1. From Normative Girl to Disruptive Student
At the beginning of the year, Tyisha fit this gender stereotype: she was an active,
successful female student. She was very engaged, offering her opinions on many subjects
related to class discussion. Most of the students started the year trying to figure out and
parrot back what the teachers wanted them to say. Because Tyisha rarely did this, but
instead offered her own opinions, the teachers initially identified her as a student who
made her own arguments. In a Paideia seminar this is desirable, so they identified Tyisha
as a good student.
The following segment comes from a class on October 9. (“T/B” stands for Mrs.
Bailey; “FST” stands for an unidentified female student; “TYI” stands for Tyisha; other
abbreviations in subsequent transcripts stand for the pseudonyms of other students;
transcription conventions are in the appendix).
T/B: okay, we've got women having ba:bies. how does that
relate to having women goddesses?
40 TYI: it doesn't, to me.
T/B: it doesn't to you. how about you?
FST: maybe they think that that's supernatural.
T/B: that that's supernatural? having a baby is supernatural.
At line 40 Tyisha fails to give an answer the teacher is looking for. She also emphasizes
her opinion, by adding the phrase “to me.” But Mrs. Bailey does not evaluate Tyisha
negatively. In fact, the teacher repeats Tyisha’s utterance and goes on to ask for another
student’s opinion. Mrs. Bailey often asks several students in turn for their opinions on
issues raised in the text, and here we see how Tyisha’s habitual personalization of her
opinions fits with the teacher’s expectations. Especially early in the year, the teachers
reacted positively to Tyisha when she offered her own opinions, because they wanted
other students to do the same.
Later on in the October 9 class, Tyisha says something deliberately off-topic,
apparently as a joke. In the following segment they are discussing bees, in order to
understand a Chinese myth that compares humans to insects.
T/B: bees do what?
TYI: kill.
290 [laughter]
MRC: some bee pollen, they raise[ pollen
T/B:
[ they fertilize=
FST: flowers.
T/B: what do spiders do? they fertilize plants. bees are
295 people who, are insects who ahh, Cassandra?
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At line 290, several students treat Tyisha’s comment as a joke, by laughing. It was a small
joke, but apparently successful. Note that the teachers do not discipline Tyisha for this.
Mrs. Bailey simply ignores Tyisha’s comment and continues with the discussion. Tyisha
then reenters the conversation more constructively.
T/B: how long do insects live?
CAN: maybe ten days, about[ a week
MRC:
[ a week.
T/B: a day, a couple of months, alright.
320 TYI: some of them a day because you know, if they bite
you, they die.
T/B: okay some of them as soon- as soon as they, they, they
put their stinger in it, they're dead. okay, now put that back
to Pampu. why might the Chinese believe or feel that ma:n
325 comes from the earth as an insect. that ma:n is similar to
an insect?
At lines 322-3, Mrs. Bailey restates and thus ratifies Tyisha’s comment as a useful
contribution, one which allows Mrs. Bailey to go on to her analogy between the mortality
of bees and the idea of humans as like insects (at lines 323-326).
At the beginning of the year, then, the teachers treated Tyisha as a normal student.
They appreciated her opinions and they did not discipline her when she made jokes. After
a month or two, however, several other students learned to offer arguments and give
evidence as the teachers wanted. At this point, the teachers increasingly distinguished
between Tyisha’s comments—which they began to characterize as “opinions” offered
without supporting evidence—and more successful students who gave better arguments.
Tyisha’s behavior had not changed much. But relative to the teachers’ expectations and to
other students’ increasingly successful participation, it looked as if Tyisha was acting
differently. In December and January, her social identity began to shift from being a good
student to being a disruptive one. Both teachers and other students began to treat her this
way.
Evidence for this comes from the teachers’ increasingly blunt evaluations of Tyisha.
Right before the following segment (from January 18), Mrs. Bailey had just given an
interpretation of Aristotle’s text. Aristotle is not saying that women are slaves to men,
only that the relationship between a man and woman is partly analogous to the relationship
between a master and a slave.
TYI: okay, when- um Sylvia was talking about the slave
and the ma:ster, the master, okay, the slave, he uses
430 his hands and stuff but- they won't give him a chance to use
his- to teach him to read and stuff and the master know
how, so he using his mind. why does he [ [4 unintelligible
syllables]
T/B:
[ okay, didn’t- you
435 just missed the connection, the con- the thing is thatdo not look at this as saying that slaves are manual workers,
slaves- women are slaves. look at these as four distinct
relationships.
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Tyisha’s reasoning may be wandering a bit from lines 428-433, but she is apparently
struggling with issues relevant to the text. Nonetheless, Mrs. Bailey interrupts to tell her
that “you just missed the connection” (lines 434-435).
This incident alone might have been momentary impatience on the teacher’s part, but
the following evaluation follows immediately.
T/B: and in Greeks- in Greece, there certainly were
slaves that used their mind. yeah?
445 FST: I’m talking about going back to what Tyisha said
about how slaves that- well- if, okay if a master didn't teach
the slaves how to read, how did they learn how to read?
how did we know how to read and talk ourselves?
T/B: o[kay, you just missed450 TYI: [ right, thank you.
T/B: you just missed the point.
JAS: you missed the point. we're not compari[ng them.
TYI:
[I know,
but I'm talking about455 T/B: okay, look at this again, mental, manual workers,
are mental workers
At line 445 a student refers back to the earlier comment by Tyisha, building on Tyisha’s
comment to ask a question. Normally, these teachers encouraged students to refer to each
other’s comments, as a way of developing more complex arguments across the group.
And at line 450 Tyisha explicitly thanks the other student for referencing her point and
asking the question.
But Mrs. Bailey immediately jumps in (at line 449) and returns to her earlier
evaluation of Tyisha’s point, with similar phrasing: “you just missed the point.” The
speed of Mrs. Bailey’s intervention, and her blunt characterization of Tyisha’s (and the
second student’s) point, is uncharacteristic for this class. These teachers want students to
develop their own arguments, and they generally help students who are struggling to
articulate something. But by January they have started to presuppose that Tyisha’s points
will not contribute to the conversation—that her comments are disruptive and not
substantive. Note that another student (Jasmine) echoes Mrs. Bailey’s evaluation of
Tyisha, at line 452. Other students, too, have come to presuppose that Tyisha is disruptive.
Jasmine also uses “we” in line 452, probably to distinguish Tyisha and her one defender
from the teachers and the other students.
This split between Tyisha and the rest of the girls broadened over time, as Tyisha was
increasingly identified as a disruptive student. The teachers continued to react quickly and
harshly to many of her comments, presupposing that her contributions were intellectually
unproductive and disruptive. The following segment, for instance, comes from January 25.

1055

T/B: okay. well I think that he's talking more not
about not being with people, but that he: will not
have to have people bail him out at any point. he
can make it on his own.
TYI: so you gonna be the only person living
there?

40

1060

Social Identification Beyond the Speech Event

T/B: no. that's not what he's saying, Tyisha.
CAN: he's saying that he can live without people
helping him.

At lines 1052-1055, Mrs. Bailey is summarizing her interpretation of a point. Tyisha
offers a gloss at lines 1056-1057, a gloss which misstates Mrs. Bailey’s point, and the
teacher reacts immediately by telling Tyisha she’s wrong. This quick and blunt response
contrasts with the teachers’ habitual reaction to other students, and to Tyisha earlier in the
year, when they would have explored her point or been more gentle in evaluating her
response—as they were on October 9 when reacting to her joke about the bees. Another
student gives a more accurate gloss at lines 1059-1060 and the class goes on discussing the
point, ignoring Tyisha.
By February, Tyisha’s identity as a disruptive outcast had solidified. It was then
generally presupposable that she was disorganized, prone to offer comments that took the
class off-topic, and concerned with her own ideas more than with helping the group
develop a coherent discussion. Thus Tyisha became an exception to the gender stereotype
that teachers and students continued to presuppose. She was a girl who nonetheless was
not a good student and was not likely to succeed.
By early February, Mr. Smith (“T/S”) was characterizing Tyisha explicitly as a bad
student who does not listen. The following segment comes from February 11.
50 T/S: I will do a spot check, spot check your notebook.
the notebook, and you better listen Tyisha, because you
have a habit of never listening to me. °Tyisha°
TYI: I know what you’re talking about[
T/S:
[no.
55 TYI: you’re talking about[ the notebook
T/S:
[°your ears are unfortunately
closed sometimes.°
…
T/S: number five. who made the laws?
65 FST: the assembly.
T/S: okay[ what page?
TYI:
[°the king°
T/S: no. you’re wrong. because you’re guessing without
looking. and that is=[
70 TYI:
[no way.
T/S: =exactly what you do as a bad[ student.
TYI:
[no I wasn’t
T/S: halt.
At line 52, Mr. Smith says that Tyisha never listens to him. And at line 71 he calls her a
bad student. Mr. Smith had a temper, and he sometimes made inappropriate comments
like this about other students. But Tyisha was much more likely to be the target, because
teachers and students had presupposed that she was a disruptive student.
My data contain at least a dozen other telling examples, from December through May,
of how Tyisha was explicitly identified as disruptive by the teachers and students. They
accused her of not listening, of being wrong, and of making comments that led discussion
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off-track. These comments collectively show that the teachers and students had begun to
identify her differently than they did earlier in the year. From September through
November she was just another student, but by December and January she had become a
disruptive student. As such, they often assumed that her comments were incorrect or offtopic. Instead of taking time to explore the reasoning behind her comments—and, it must
be said, there was only sometimes defensible reasoning discernible behind them—the
teachers and other students quickly dismissed Tyisha and moved back to their own
discussion.
In addition to these explicit metapragmatic characterizations of Tyisha, I have also
identified eight segments from classroom discussions (lasting on average more than half
an hour), from November through February, in which Tyisha plays a major role. She
herself becomes an example in each of these cases, an example that gets discussed as
analogous to the text and as analogous to the curricular issue on the table. Tyisha becomes
the favored example when a text includes an outcast—someone who acts for his or her
own good without considering the good of the society. As teachers and students discuss
more of these examples, Tyisha’s identity as an outcast in the classroom becomes more
and more heavily presupposed. Tyisha’s identity certainly gets presupposed and
reinforced in other classroom events, but I argue that these eight classroom discussions
carry particular force because of the extended focus on her as a topic and because of the
power that such participant examples can have (cf. Wortham 1994, 2001b).
All of these eight cases—which I argue play an important role in Tyisha’s identity
development—are participant examples (Wortham 1994, 2001b). Participant examples
include, as a character in the example, at least one teacher or student who is participating
in the classroom discussion. Such examples double the roles played by those teachers or
students, because they become characters in the example as well as participants in the
classroom discussion. This doubling of roles makes participant examples rich sites for
socially salient interactional positioning. Discussion of participants' hypothetical identities
within the example can communicate things about the actual participants, as a sort of
double entendre.
Furthermore, it turns out that the content represented by a participant example and the
interactional patterns enacted through that example can sometimes run parallel (Wortham
1994, 1997). That is, in discussing certain events as the content of an example, teachers
and students sometimes enact analogous events in their classroom interaction. Examples
involving such a parallel between representation and enactment are particularly likely to
contribute both to social identification and to academic learning (Wortham 2001b). The
following section analyzes a participant example that involved Tyisha, in order to illustrate
how this type of classroom discussion facilitates her social identification in the classroom.
3.2. Tyisha the “courageous liar”
Tyisha did not become a disruptive student solely through the teachers’ intervention.
Tyisha herself often embraced an oppositional identity. Sometimes she did this in ways
that the teachers themselves identified as productive, when she challenged arguments
made by the teachers and authors of the texts. Sometimes, however, her penchant for
defending unpopular positions took her too far, and she wasted class time while refusing to
admit a mistake. She also made arguments and interrupted the teachers in apparently
deliberate attempts to antagonize them.
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The following example illustrates these behaviors. This discussion occurred on
January 18, while the the two teachers and the students were exploring Aristotle’s
definition of courage as articulated in his Politics. Specifically, at this point in the
discussion, Mrs. Bailey had asked whether a person could courageously obey as well as
courageously resist. She suggested that one could obey courageously, and she gave brief
examples like overcoming anxiety to give a presentation in class. Tyisha then volunteered
her own participant example, supposedly to support Mrs. Bailey’s point, saying “Mrs.
Bailey, I think I have one.”
As it turns out, however, Tyisha’s example does not illustrate Mrs. Bailey’s point and
it leads the class off track. Given that Tyisha laughs while giving the example, and that
she defends her example with increasingly outrageous claims, it may well be that she
intended to make a joke and take the class off topic. She did similar things at other times
during the year. This example illustrates how Tyisha interactionally positions herself, and
gets positioned, as a disruptive and marginal member of the class. Tyisha introduces her
example as follows.
TYI: okay, I(hhh)- I had a friend. and she was like,
sneaking out with a boy, and she lied and said that she was
going with her friends. (hh) a(h)nd she told me, if my
270 mother call, to tell her she was at the zoo with her friend
Stacey. now that took her courage to te(h)ll me.
FST: (hhh)
TYI: and it took c(hh)oura(h)ge for me to tell her
mother that.
275 FST: ˚mhm˚
T/B: did it take courage for[ her to tell her mother tha[t?
FST:
[ no
[I
don't think so
T/B: why would th[at
280 TYI:
[ yeah it took courage to tell my
mother
FST: [3 unintelligible syllables]
MRC: I don’t think it took courage.
Tyisha gives her example at lines 267-271, and then at lines 273-274 she claims that it
took courage for her to lie to her friend’s mother. Since they are discussing Aristotle’s
definition of courage, this might be a relevant example to explore—even though it does
not illustrate the concept of “courage through obedience” that Mrs. Bailey had asked for.
But the example presents interactional problems for the teachers, as Tyisha probably
intended. Because the example involves immoral behavior (at least from an adult’s point
of view), if Tyisha’s behavior was in fact courageous then the teachers would have to
acknowledge her courage while condemning her behavior. We might speculate that
Tyisha is using this discussion of subject matter to put the teachers in an awkward position,
or at least to slip illicit topics into an academic discussion in such a way that she cannot be
sanctioned for it. She is both adopting and reveling in an oppositional identity, as an
adolescent who helps her friend get away with illicit dates and who can also manage to
talk about this in an academic discussion—perhaps even in such a way that her
oppositional behavior gets classified as courageous. Thus she gives an example of herself
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being oppositional in relation to her friend’s mother, and she herself acts oppositional in
class by giving this as an example.
By laughing several times while she gives her example, Tyisha (at lines 267, 269, 271
and 273) and another student (at line 272) seem to support this interpretation of her
example as partly a joke, or as an attempt to trap the teachers between illicit topics and
academic content. At line 276, Mrs. Bailey implies that Tyisha’s behavior was not
courageous, and a student agrees with her at lines 277-278. Tyisha interrupts Mrs.
Bailey’s next comment, to restate that it did in fact take courage on her part. Another
student (Maurice, or “MRC”) then sides with the teacher at line 283, denying that Tyisha’s
lie took courage. So Mrs. Bailey’s initial reaction to Tyisha’s challenge is to deny that
Tyisha was courageous.
Mr. Smith, however, gives Tyisha another opportunity to make her case in the next
segment. He interrupts Mrs. Bailey’s attempt to change the topic, saying (at lines 287288) “let her finish…”. Then he asks:
295 T/S: then, which is courage?
T/B: shhh
FST: [so you gonna sit there and lie to[her face
T/S: [lying
[to lie: or to tell the
truth be[cause you=
300 FST: [˚to tell the truth˚
T/S: = knew that she was wrong.
CAN: ˚cause its wrong˚
FST: tell the truth. tell the truth
TYI: both of them=
305 JAS: =both of them take courage [ to me
TYI:
[=both of them take
cou [rage, you all wrong
T/S:[ explai:n how bo th .
Mr. Smith calls for Tyisha to elaborate her example, perhaps hoping that she will provide
something more for them to work with in interpreting Aristotle’s account of courage. He
also explicitly describes Tyisha as “lying,” for the first time. When Tyisha gave the
example, she used the metapragmatic verb “tell” to describe her own act of speaking (lines
270, 273), although she said her friend was “sneaking out” and “lied” to her mother (lines
268).
In a segment not shown here Tyisha then elaborates her example, somewhat unclearly,
and several students speak over each other. In Mr. Smith’s response, however, it becomes
clear that he was not really siding with Tyisha. At lines 295 and 298-299, Mr. Smith asks
whether it was really courageous to lie, or whether it would in fact have been more
courageous to tell her friend’s mother the truth. At lines 300, 302 and 303, other students
side with Mr. Smith, claiming that lying is wrong and that telling the truth would have
been more courageous. But at line 304 Tyisha claims that both lying and telling the truth
could have been courageous, and at line 305 Jasmine agrees with her. Tyisha ends with a
characteristic utterance at line 307—“you all wrong.” Note how she is separating herself
off from the rest of the class and defending an unpopular position. This separation is not
only enacted in her argument against the teachers and other students in the classroom, but
also presupposed in the content of the example. By describing herself as someone who
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breaks moral rules, which the teachers and many of the students adhere to, Tyisha also
marginalizes herself from other members of the group.
Mr. Smith then asks Tyisha to explain how both lying and telling the truth could be
courageous. So she continues.
TYI: because (hhhh[h)
310 FST:
[ because
T/S: let her
TYI: if I lyin’- If I'm sittin’ here lying in another person
mother face, that took courag(h)e. [ and if I'm=
T/S:
[ why?
315 TYI: =telling her because you don'tFST: lies.
T/S: have you never lied to your mother?
FST: ˚hnuh˚
TYI: no- not- not to no one else’s momma, no.
320 T/S: have you ever lied to a teacher who is a mother?
FST: uh(hhh)
TYI: that's different.
FST: aw man.
STS: [2 seconds of laughter]
325 TYI: that’s very different um- I mean that's different. I'm
always over there visiting this friend and her mother, might
have had trus- trust in me and I come over and tell her this
big, bo:ld faced lie.
From lines 309-315, Tyisha reiterates her claim that lying to her friend’s mother took
courage. Mr. Smith then takes control of the conversation, asking her questions at lines
314, 317, and 320, although his questions still do not make clear how this example
illuminates Aristotle’s definition of courage.
Mr. Smith’s question at line 320 brings the example closer to students’ and teachers’
real identities in the classroom, when he asks whether Tyisha has “ever lied to a teacher
who is a mother.” Everyone knows that Mrs. Bailey is a mother—in fact, the mother of a
teenage girl. So Mr. Smith’s question highlights the interactional tension that Tyisha’s
example raises. Tyisha is proud of the fact that she lied to her friend’s mother, even
though Mrs. Bailey and other adults would clearly identify with the friend’s mother and
consider this wrong. Tyisha thus opposes herself to Mrs. Bailey and people like her.
Tyisha revels in this oppositional identity, as illustrated in the sequence of
increasingly colorful metapragmatic terms that she uses to describe her lie. As noted
above, she started by using the verb “tell” to describe what she said to her friend’s mother
(at line 270). Mr. Smith reframed this as a “lie” at line 288, and opposed such lying to
“telling the truth” (line 298). Another student spiced this up a bit: “so you gonna sit there
and lie to her face” (line 297). Tyisha herself embraced this characterization of her act at
lines 312-313: “I’m sitting here lying in another person mother face.” And she ends up
with: “her mother might have had trust in me and I come over and tell her this big boldfaced lie” (lines 326-328). Far from euphemizing what she did, Tyisha ends up embracing
the non-normative character of her action and proudly flaunting social norms. This clearly
opposes her to Mrs. Bailey, who might well be worrying about her own daughter’s friends
doing the same thing to her.
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In addition to embracing an oppositional identity here, Tyisha has also embedded this
assertion of oppositional identity within an academic discussion about Aristotle’s concept
of courage. This hijacking of the discussion itself constitutes an oppositional act. Mr.
Smith nonetheless continues to pursue the discussion as if it had academic merit. Perhaps
he thinks that he can win the argument about whether Tyisha was in fact courageous. Or
perhaps he recognizes that her argument does have some merit (it is at least arguable that
one can sin courageously). If Tyisha’s purpose is to hijack the discussion, however, his
pursuing the example furthers her agenda.
T/S: did you feel courage or did you feel guilt?
330 TYI: I felt both of them ˚ [2 unintelligible syllables] ˚
T/S: courage to be guilty? [quizzical intonation contour,
mid-low-mid]
TYI: (hhh) nah, but it took courage to do[ that.
JAS:
[ it do take
335 courage to be guilty.
FST: [1 second of laughter]
TYI: I know. like we goin’ to [ steal something. it took=
T/S:
[ you should be guilty
TYI: =courage for me to go sneakin out of the store, right?
340 FST: hahaha
T/S: courage to be guilty.
JAS: you thief.
STS: [1 second of laughter]
JAS: cause- and you- okay, you go in the store. and you steal
345 something, I mean [ that take courage =
TYI:
[it took courage to do it
JAS: =to steal something, and then you gonna be guilty
afterward, right? right?
TYI: s- say it. go ahead.
350 STS: [2 seconds of laughter]
At line 329, Mr. Smith returns to the question of whether Tyisha felt courage or guilt
while lying. Tyisha claims she felt both at line 330. Mr. Smith then seems to be making
fun of her argument with a “quizzical” intonation contour. Students laugh a bit after his
remark. After Tyisha reiterates that her lie was courageous at line 333, Jasmine apparently
makes fun of Tyisha at lines 334-335, saying “it do take courage to be guilty.” Students
laugh at the joke.
It is ambiguous here, however, whether the other students are laughing at Tyisha or
with Tyisha. If my reading has been correct, Tyisha has all along intended for her
example to be at least partly a joke. So it may be that she has succeeded at getting other
students to laugh. Jasmine’s comment at lines 334-335, however, seems to follow up on
Mr. Smith’s quizzical comment and to make fun of Tyisha. Tyisha responds with a
second example, one involving more serious transgressions than the first, at lines 337-339.
She may be trying to build on the success of her first example, which managed both to
make a joke and to condone oppositional behavior. But Mr. Smith’s echoes Jasmine’s
tease at line 341, and then Jasmine herself laughingly calls Tyisha a thief.
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It appears for a moment as if everyone is laughing at Tyisha, but then Jasmine sides
with her in the argument against Mr. Smith. At lines 344-348, Jasmine agrees with Tyisha
(and her own earlier comment) that moral transgressions like stealing take courage.
Tyisha echoes this at line 346. It is relevant here that Jasmine is the most verbally skilled
of the students. She won the school-wide student talent competition that year, and she
regularly had the class rolling with laughter. Her comments here contribute to the
academic argument but are also very funny.
At this point, in several lines not included here, a student objects that stealing is
wrong, while Tyisha and Jasmine defend their claim that stealing can be both courageous
and guilt-inducing. Then another student claims that stealing is wrong and brings the
discussion back to the concept of courage.
LIN: I don't think that's courage to go and steal a candy bar
[ because courage- right=
MST: [ it’s stupid
LIN: =cause courage, the virtue of courage, what we read
of courage was to do something- something goo:d, not to
do something and go and do something [evil.
390 TYI:
[that’s not
true
FST:
[yeah that’s
right
TYI: courage is not just doing something goo:d.
395 [students talking at once]
TYI: if I go[ shoot you in the head
T/B:
[ shhhhhh
[students arguing]
T/B: ahh, if we can- if we can talk about courage as being
400 something good, the virtue of courage, and go back to that
definition, and I know you never bought into it, but the rest
of us seem to be, using this as a definition, so therefore,
we'd ask you to kind of go along with it.
FST: okay.
405 T/B: the idea of courage, was not just doing things you're
afraid to do, but doing things that- overcoming your fear
for a good reason. Linda?
LIN: I was saying what Tyisha said, if you go shoot
somebody in the head, you gonna call that courage? or you
410 is gonna call that stupid?
385

While Linda disagrees with Tyisha and Jasmine’s claim that stealing requires courage (at
line 384), one of the male students (“MST,” an unidentified male student) slips in a
characterization of stealing: “it’s stupid” (line 386). One might infer that people like
Tyisha who defend such behavior are also stupid. Linda then gives an even more highly
presupposing evaluation of stealing and other moral transgressions: they are “evil” (line
389). This casts Tyisha and Jasmine as defending something unforgivable.
Tyisha continues to argue that one can courageously commit immoral acts. But at line
396 she chooses an example that does not seem well-designed to pursue an academic
discussion. “If I go shoot you in the head” is provocative, because of the second person
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pronoun and because shooting someone is even more unethical than lying and stealing .
By escalating the immorality of the topic, Tyisha seems to be pushing the discussion
toward what Goffman (1974) called “flooding out”—bursting out of its character as an
academic discussion and becoming simply an occasion for laughter or confrontation.
Mrs. Bailey’s reaction at lines 399-403 frames Tyisha’s comments as an attempt to
disrupt the classroom discussion. Mrs. Bailey could have said: “that’s an interesting
argument Tyisha, but how can an act be both virtuous and immoral at once? Would
Aristotle have agreed with that?” Instead, she skillfully frames Tyisha’s comment as
moving against the will of the rest of the class, without baldly asserting her own authority.
She starts at lines 399-401 by establishing her version of the contested issue as a
“definition.” Tyisha has argued that immoral acts can require courage, and this is a
defensible position. But Mrs. Bailey asserts that courage is something good, by definition.
Tyisha and Jasmine “never bought into” this definition, “but the rest of us” did. Tyisha
and Jasmine, then, get positioned outside the teachers’ and others students’ group, as
people who adopt idiosyncratic definitions and thus hinder the group discussion. Mrs.
Bailey acknowledges their dissent, and asks them to go along instead of imposing her will.
It would violate her pedagogical philosophy to tell students what to think. But in fact she
has characterized Tyisha and Jasmine not only as outcasts, but also as the sort of people
who refuse to accept agreed-upon definitions, and who thus disrupt the productive work
that the rest of the class is pursuing.
In this discussion of lying, stealing and shooting, then, Tyisha both embraces an
oppositional identity and also skillfully manages to insert discussion of these illicit topics
into discussion of the curriculum. She both describes herself as and enacts an identity as
clever and counter-hegemonic (or, from the teachers’ point of view, as annoying and
disruptive)—thus creating a parallel between her narrated and her enacted identities. The
teachers and other students follow Tyisha’s lead and identify her as morally suspect.
Their discussion excludes Tyisha from the group of teachers and other students in two
ways. First, Tyisha gets (willingly) described as the sort of person who would baldly lie to
a friend’s mother, unlike the rest of them. Second, she positions herself in the discussion,
and gets positioned, as a student who makes jokes, takes the class off-topic, and refuses to
accept generally agreed-upon definitions. Her identity as a disruptive student thus gets
further solidified—at Tyisha’s own initiative, but also with the help of the teachers and
students.
4. Conclusions
The teachers and students discussed several examples like this one across the
academic year, in which Tyisha was both described and interactionally positioned as a
disruptive student (cf. Wortham, 2003, for another case and Wortham, 2004, for another
perspective on this same case; Wortham, in press, offers a detailed account of Tyisha and
other students across the whole academic year). These examples, together with explicit
metapragmatic descriptions of her as disruptive, established this identity for Tyisha. From
September through November, she was a normal student. But in December, January and
February she increasingly became a disruptive one. This social identification emerged in
contrast to the macro and meso-level presuppositions about girls as more likely to succeed,
and in this respect Tyisha’s identity was unexpected.
Teachers and students did draw on macro and meso-level categories to identify Tyisha.
The concept of a disruptive student presupposes well-established macro-level models of
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appropriate classroom behavior and the authority of teachers, and the category of “loud
black girls” also circulates more widely (Fordham, 1996). Note, however, that all the
students identified as cooperative, intelligent and promising in this classroom were also
black girls. In order to account for why Tyisha in particular was identified as disruptive,
as opposed to all her black female peers, we need a more complex account that shows how
macro-level categories were appropriated and transformed as teachers and students built
local models of identity, and how these local models were presupposed in particular events
of identification that involved Tyisha. Tyisha’s trajectory of identification must be
explored, across the months in which it emerged, not simply derived from macro-level
patterns or individual micro-level events.
Social identification, then, emerges across a trajectory of events. There can be no
general formul for how to explain the emergence of a social identity—one that explains all
social identification in terms of certain timescales and processes. In this case, local
classroom models of identity played a central role, but only as part of a configuration
including more widely circulating and shorter timescale events. It is an empirical question
in each case what configuration of timescales is relevant to explaining social identification.

Appendix: Transcription Conventions
'-'
'?'
'.'
'_'
(1.0)
'['

'[…]'
','
'(hh)'

abrupt breaks or stops
rising intonation
falling intonation
(underline) stress
silences, timed to the nearest second
indicates simultaneous talk by two speakers, with one utterance
represented on top of the other and the moment of overlap marked by
left brackets
transcriber comment
pause or breath without marked intonation
laughter breaking into words while speaking
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